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ATTORNEY & CLIENT-LIEN-PRIORITY-SET-OFF. 
-SMITH V. CAYUGA LAKE
CEMENT Co., 95 N. Y. SuPP. 236.-Held, that where a judgment for plaintiff is
wholly for disbursements incurred and services rendered by his attorney in
correcting an erroneous decision, and plaintiff is a non-resident and insolvent,
the attorney's lien for coF':; and compensation is superior to the defendant's
claim for a set-off on a judgment in his favor rendered by another court in the
same action.
The practice of courts, both in England and in this country, has differed
widely in regardto this proposition. In England, the attorney's right to have
his fees and disbursements paid out of the judgment obtained has long been
recognized. Marshall v'. Meech, zo Am. Rep. 573. The courts of Common
Pleas and Chancery held the lien subordinate to defendant's right of set-off.
Taylor v. Pofiham, i5 Ves. 79. Later, these courts reversed their position
and adopted the rule of the Court of King's Bench. Simpson v. Lamb, 49
Eng. L. & Eq. 59. The same rule was adopted by the Supreme Court of New
York in the early case of Devoy v. Boyer, 3 Johns. 247. In the majority of
states the attorney is deemed, to the amount of his lien, an equitable assignee
of the judgment. Marshall v. Meec, IO Am. Rep. 573. On the other
hand, the courts of a few states hold the right of set-off is superior to the
attorney's lien. McDonald v. Smith, 57 Ves. 502; .fosely v. Norman, 74
Ala. 422.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FEDERAL COUitTs-HEAS CORPUs-CoNcLUSIVZ-
NESS OF STATE DEcisioN.-BRowN V. URQUHART, 139 FED. 846.- Held, that the
decision of the Supreme Court of a state that a state prisoner is not held in
violation of rights under U. S. Constitution is not conclusive upon a federal
court, which may, in its discretion, determine the question for itself on a writ
of habeas corfius.
The decision of the highest court of a state should be obtained and care-
fully reviewed before a writ issue from a federal court. Peofile of N. K v.
Eno, x55 U. S. 89. And the petition must clearly show an irreconcilable
antagonism between the federal and state law, otherwise the writ will not issue.
In re Hoover, 3o Fed. 5!. A claim under a provision in a state law would not
justify a writ of habeas corfiusbya federal court. Gut v. Minnesota, 7 6 U. S. 35;
In re Bresnahan, 18 Fed. 62: In exfiarte Calvera, I Wash. C. C., a foreign
minister, illegally confined under a proper state warrant, was refused a writ.
A noted case was Whitten v. Tomlinson, z6o U. S. 231, where, although an
indictment lacked the words - a true bill," and was found by the grand jury
by mistake and misconception, the federal courts refused to interpose.
CONTRATs-PxomisE TO ANSWER FOR THE DEBT OF ANOTHER-STATUTE OF
FxAUDS.-SMITH v. BURDETT, 95 N. Y. Supp. I88.-Held, that an oral agree-
ment by an owner to pay for the work and material furnished by a sub-con-
tractor in the construction of a building, in case the principal contractor
neglected to do so, is unenforceable because within the Statute of Frauds.
The interest which the promisor has in the performance of a contract by
another, or the benefit which he may derive thereby, cannot determine hislia-
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bility. That liability arises from the character of the promise, and the inter-
est in the principal contract and the benefit to be derived from it becomes
a matter of consideration only as they may serve to determine that character.
Clay v. Walton, 9 Cal. 328. The vital point in cases of this class is: Was the
contract original? Payne v. Baldwin, -4 Barbour 570. In order that the
promise may be held to be within the statute it is essential that there be a
binding and subsisting obligation or liability to the promisee to which the
promise is collateral. 151 Ill. 175. The evidence required to change a con-
tract relation between a plaintiff and a third party and to prove a promise to
pay the debt of another as a new and original undertaking and not a contract
of suretyship, must be clear and satisfactory; otherwise it will fall within
the statute. Haverly v. Mercer, 78 Pa. 257. A case directly in point is
Diringer v. Aoyniham, ro N. Y. Supp. 54o, which held that a promise by
defendant to see that workmen of sub-contractor were paid was a promise to
pay debt of another, and, not being in writing, was unenforceable.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE--QUESTIONS FOR JURY.-CRAUCH vs. BROOKLYN
HEIGHTs Ry. Co., 129 N. Y. ST. REP. r6.-Plaintiff was injured at a grade
crossing while proceeding to defendants' station-Held, that the fact that the
plaintiff had seen a train approaching and had not waited to see if train would
stop at the station, was not, under all circumstances, negligence in law.
It is established universally and beyond a doubt that negligence and con-
tributory negligence are questions of fact for the jury, except in rare cases.
Burns v. Town of Elba, 32 Wis. 6o5; Batt. & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Shifley,
31 Md. 370. That there are exceptional cases is unquestioned. Tyson v.
Tyson, 37 Md. 567-581; Balt. &- Ohio R. R. Co. v. Fizjfatrick, 35 Md. 32.
But there is hopeless conflict on these cases. Compare thefollowing: Butler
V. R. R. Co., 126 Pa. St. r6o; Lewis v. Balt. & Ohio R. R. Co., 38 Md. 588;
Brown v. Barnes, 151 Pa. St. 562; Moore v. Westervelt, 21 N. Y. 103.
In some states the question is controlled by the fact that the burden of show-
ing ordinary care is put on the plaintiff. Alger v. City of Lowell, 3 Allen
402; Cramer vs. City of Burlington, 42 Iowa, 315. But see Bradwell v.
Pittsburg & West End Ry. Co., 139 Pa. St. 404; Brown v. Traction Co.,
14 Pa. Sup. Ct. 594. For a case where there is no room for doubt see Bali.
City Pass. Ry. Co. v. Wilkinson, 30 Md. 224.
CORPORATIONS-EMINENT DOMAIN-LEGALITY OF CORPORATE EXISTENCE.-
EDDLEMAN ET UX. V. UNION COUNTY TRAcrIoN & POWER Co.,75 N. E. 5IO (ILL).
Held, that the legality of the existence of a corporation cannot be attacked in
condemnation proceedings instituted by it, but only in a direct proceeding by
quo warranto.
The better rule seems to be as announced in the opinion above. W. & P.
R. Co. v. C. &- C. R. &- L. Co., 114 N. C. 69o; Morrson v. Forman, t6x Ill.
247; Niemeyer v. Little Rock function Ry., 43 Ark. ii. But some courts
hold that a de jure corporate existence must be shown when it is sought to
take property by eminent domain. In re Brooklyn W. &. N. Ry. Co., 72
N. Y. 245; Powers v. H. &- L. Ry. Co., 33 Oh. St., 429; Orr&h School Dist.
v. Dorton, 125 Mo. 439. Dejure corporate existence must be set up in actions
by a corporation to collect subscriptions made prior to incorporation. Indiana
F. &' H. Co. v. Herkimer, 46 Ind. 142; Schloss v. Montgomery Trade Co.
87 Ala. 414. The subscriber may be estopped to attack the corporate exist-
ence if he participated in the formation of the corporation. Bells Afifieal,
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1si Pa. St. 88; Musgrove v. Morrison, 54 Md. x6r. In an action for sub-
scriptions made after incorporation, de facto existence need not be shown.
Casey v. Gali; 94 U. S. 673. As ineminent domain proceedings, there is also
a difference of opinion as to whether de jure corporate existence need be
shown in actions by corporations to collect assessments for benefits. That it
must be shown, see Dusenback v. Attica & B. G. Road Co., 43 Ind. 265-
That it need not be, see Evans v. Lewis. i2I Ill. 478; Reclamation Dist. No.
542 v. Turner, xo4 Cal. 334.
CRIMINAL LAW-REMARKS OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY-ERROR.--PROPLZ V.
WOLF, 95 N. Y. SUPP., 264.-Held, that the remarks of the prosecuting attor-
ney to the jury cannot be made the basis of error where they have no ten-
dency to create greater passion or prejudice than the admitted facts in evi-
dence created. McLaughlin and Ingraham, JJ., dissenting.
As to what comments by counsel to the jury may be made the basis of error
the courts are not all agreed. It has been held that intemperate language
calculated to prejudice the jury and prevent a fair trial is ground for reversal.
Cargill v. Commonwealth, 13 S. W. (Ky.) g16. But the objection to such
remarks must be made promptly. Grosse v. State, x3 Tex. App. 364. So,
also, where the accused has failed to testify in his own behalf, this may not
be commented on by the prosecutor. Price v. Commonwealth, 77 Va. 393.
Abusive language towards the defendant will be ground for reversal. State
v. Young, go Mo. 666; Stone v. State, 22 Tex. App. x85; though the con-
trary has been held, Anderson v. State, 104 Ind. 467. But any characteriza-
tion of the defendant, there being evidence to sustain such expressions, will
be allowed. State v. Brooks, 92 MO. 542.
DAMAGCS-MVENTAL SUFFERING.-WooDSTOCK IRON WORKS V. STOCKDALE,
3) S. W. 335 (ALA.).-Held, that a husband cannot recover damages for men-
tal suffering to himself causcd by the illness of his wife.
In actions for injury to persons mental suffering is an element of damage
as an incident to the bodily suffering. Chicago v. McLean, 133 Ill. r48. But
mental suffering for the injury to others is no ground of action. Cowden v.
Wright, 24 Wend. 429; Long v. Morrison, 14 Ind. 595. And such has been
the holding, as in the principal case, even when it is the husband's mental suf-
fering for his wife's injury. Hyatt v. Adams, x6 Mich. i8o. Some of the
states, however, have made an exception to this rule in the case of telegraph
companies, allowing a person who has suffered mental anguish through failure
of delivery of a telegram to recover damages. Relle vu. Telegrafih Co., 55 Tex.
308; Tel. Co. v. Crocker, 135 Ala. 492. Even in Texas, where this rule was
started, it is confined to telegraph cases and exceedingly limited. Tel. Co.
v. Sfilar, 126 Fed. 295. However most states decline to follow it. Giddens v.
Tel. Co., III Ga. 824.
EJECTMENT-INTEREST RECOVERABLE-MINERAL RIGHTS.-MORAGNE ET AL
v. Dot Rx DEM. MORAGNE, 39 S. E. (ALA.) 16i.-Held, that an administrator
may maintain ejectment to recover a mineral interest in lands.
"Ejectment will lie only for things whereof possession may be delivered
by the sheriff." Black v. Hefburne, 2 Yeates 333. The thing claimed must
be a corporeal hereditament. Rowan v. Kelsey, 18 Barb. 484. In this term
have been included a room in a house, Otis v. Smith, 26 Mass. 293, and a real
fixture, Stancel v. Calvert, 6o N. C. 1o4. But the action will not lie for a
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mere license, a right of way, or an easement. Hancock v. McAvon, 3s Pa.
St. 460. The English courts formerly treated all grants of minerals as incor-
poreal hereditaments because no livery of seisin could be made, but the gene-
ral rule to-day is that such a grant passes an interest in land. Caldwell v.
Fulton, 31 Pa. 475; Fairchild v. Dunbar Furnace Co., 128 Pa. 497. In some
cases, however, grant of right to take minerals from land, not being exclusive
right to mineral products :s considered a mere license. Silsby v. Trotter, 29
N.J. Eq. 228. But see Beatty v'. Gregory, 17 Iowa, iog, where licensee, after
entry and expenditure of labor and money, was allowed to maintain eject-
ment.
EQUITY-CANCELLATION OF INSTRUMENTS--FRAUD-REMEDY AT LAW. WIL-
SON ET AL V. MILLER, 39 SOUTHERN, 178 (ALA.). Held, that the deed, under
which a plaintiff claims in ejectment, will not be cancelled, on the ground
that the deed and record have been fraudulently altered. Haralson, J., dis-
senting.
If an action at law on an instrument in writing can be fully defended on
the ground that it was obtained by fraud, the defendant cannot file a bill for
the cancellation and surrender of the document. Cable v. U. S. Life Ins.
Co., I91 U. S. 288. In actions of ejectment defendant may show invalidity
or fraud of plaintiff's-title. Sherman v. Buick, 93 U. S. 2o9; Rogers v.
Brent, io Ill. 573. If there is an action pending against one in a suit at law
wherein his title may be put in issue and established, there is no equity in a
bill to quiet title, and such a bill will be dismissed. Normant v. Eureka
Comfiany, 39 Am. St. Rep. 45. Equity will entertain jurisdiction to remove
cloud where complainant is in possession or from other cause without ade-
quate legal remedy. L Story Eq. Juris. Page 745, Note A; Sullivan v. Fin-
negan, ioi Mass. 447. In order that equity may cancel a deed it must consti-
tute a cloud on title. In other words, it must be firimafacie evidence of title.
Bisfiham's Equity, 449.
EVIDENCE-COMPELLING PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS-SuBPOENA. DucEs
TECUM.-MILLER V. MUTUAL RESERvE FUND LIFE ASSN., 139 FED. 864.-
Where a subfina duces tecum required the production of a large list of books
and papers, many of which apparently can have no bearing on the issues
raised by the pleadings, held, that the court will not punish the party for
contempt for failure to obey the subhena, but the party applying will be re-
quired to take out separate subf6wnas, each of which may then be considered
on its merits.
The judge in this case evidently considered the spirit much more than the
letter of the law as the general rule is in line with the statutory provisions
that the party must attend with the documents demanded and leave the ques-
tion of their admission to the discretion of the court. Reynolds on Ev., p.
x68; In ex farte Brown, 7 Mo. App., 484, a manager of a telegraph office
refused to produce his dispatch files, attempting to excuse himself under a
statute which provided for punishment of any officer or servant of a telegraph
company disclosing the contents of a dispatch, but he was obliged to produce
the files or be in contempt. The penalty laid down in Col. Fire Co. V. Pur-
cell, 25 La. Ann., 283, was that the party not producing books and papers
under the subfiana should not be in contempt, but that the facts stated in the
application may be taken as proved. Nor may an attorney refuse to submit
his client's papers under his privilege as attorney, as this would be assuming
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the right of the court which alone can determine the question of privilege in
each case. Mfitchell's Case, 12 Abb. Prac. (N. Y.).
EVIDENCE--DECLARATION OF AGENT AFTER CONCLUSION OF AGENCY-
ADMISSIBILITY.-BURBANK v. HAMMOND, 75 N. E. 102 (MASS.).-Held, that a
letter of a land broker written after the consummation of a sale, and tending
to show that he knew of false representations made therein, is inadmissible,
although the broker is still employed to care for the property.
While it is beyond controversy that declarations to be admissible must
constitute a part of the res gestae, courts are not harmonious in decisions as
to what constitutes a part of the transaction. The declaration of an agent
that land was not as he had supposed and had represented is inadmissible
after the deal has been closed, although it appears that both buyer and agent
were deceived. Lake v. Tyree, 9o Vir. 719. While evidence of what an
agent said relative to a past transaction is not admissible to prove the contract
itself it is competent to contradict the agent's statement that no such contract
was, in fact, made. Stenhouse et at. v. C C. & A. R. R., 70 N. C. 542;
although the agent may continue in the principal's employ. McComb &.' Wal-
lace's Admr's. v. N. C. R. R. Co., 70 N. C. 178. That modern cases have
relaxed the rule requiring "perfect coincidence" would appear from dissent-
ing opinion in Vicksburg, etc., R. R. Co. v. O'Brien, ix 9 V. S. 99.
EVIDENCE-PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS.-BROWN V. MOOSIC MT. COAL
Co., 6z ATL. 76 (PA.).-Held, that where two persons employ the same attor-
ney, communications to him are not privileged inter se.
This is an exception to the rule that communications between attorney
and client are privileged. It is well supported. Doheny v. Lacy, 168 N. Y.
2x3; Bauers' Estate, 79 Cal. 304. So where both parties are present, Hanlon
v. Doherty, iog Ind. 37; Cody v. Walker, 62 Mich. 157. And where terms of
compromise are offered a client's creditors, Mc Tarisk v. Denning, Anth. N. P.
X55. But the communications are privileged when parties employ the same
attorney for, adverse interests. Bowers v. Briggs, 2o Ind. 139, Hull v.
Lyon, 27 Mo. 570; as are also communications by one of two joint defend-
ants under arrest to their joint attorney. Jahnke v. State, 94 N. W. z58
(Neb.).
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-DEBTS.-VREELAND V. ROGERS, ET AL., 61 ATL.
486 (N. J.).-A judgment creditor attempted to attach property conveyed by'
the defendant prior to the judgment, on the ground that the conveyance- was
void as in defraud of creditors. Held, the onus was on the complainant to
show fraud.
The burden of proving fraudulent intent is on a subsequent creditor
who impeaches a voluntary conveyance. State Bank of Chase v. Chalton, 69
Kan. 435. Loeschigk v. Addison, 4 Abb. Practice, U. S. 21o; Wynn V.
Mason, 72 Miss. 424. Lewis v. Simon, 72 Tex. 470, even goes so far as to
say that a subsequent creditor cannot attack the conveyance as fraudulent.
It is proper to instruct the jury that the presumption is against fraud in such
a conveyance. But by statute in some states, where the property does not
actually change hands, the onus is on the grantee to show good faith. Seiden-
back v. Riley, iii N. Y. 560; Car v. Johnson, 59 Hun. 620.
INJUNCTION-ADEQUATE LEGAL REMEDY-MAINTENANCE OF RAILROAD STA-
TION.-JACQUELIN ET AL. V. ERIE R. Co., 6x ATL. z8.(N. J.).-Held, the right, if
any, to compel a railroad to maintain a station at a certain point is a legal one,
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enforceable by mandamus, and not by injunction, to prevent discontinuance
of the station.
An injunction will not be granted to restrain a railroad from removing
depot. Moore v. Brooklyn R. Co., zo8 N. Y. 98, or to compel establishment
of station, Baldwin on Railroads, p. 176; Atchinson, T. &- S. F. R. Co. v.
Denver &- New Orleans R. Co., iio U. S. 667. When the legislature has
imposed the duty of maintaining and establishing stations clearly and specifi-
cally mandamus is the proper action to compel railroad to carry out its duty.
Com. v. Eastern R. Co., 103 Mass. 254. But when there is no legislative
action with reference to these duties the courts are helpless. Northern Paci-
fc R. Co. v. Waslngton Territory, 142 U. S. 492; Some of the state courts
have, however, held that, independently of any statutory requirements, a
railroad might be compelled to establish a station when the court deemed
it necessary in the interest of the public. State v. Rebublican Valley
Railroad. 17 Neb. 647. The Illinois courts, in some cases, have shown inclina-
tion to follow thisview. Peojle v. Chicago &- Alton Railroad, 130 Ill., 175.
INJUNCTION-CONTRACTS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE-SUIT BY ATTORNEY
GENERAL.-MCCARTER, ATTY. GEN., v. FIREMEN's INS. Co., 6r ATL. 705 (N. J.).-
Held, in the absence of a statute authorizing it, the attorney general may not
maintain a suit to enjoin insurers carrying out an agreement regulating rates,
though against public policy as in restraint of trade; and the fact that the
insurers are private corporations makes no difference. -
Nowhere in this decision is there any reference to the right of the state "to
obtain a judgment merely ousting it (the corporation) from the further exercise
of an unauthorized power." Marshall on Private Corporations, See. 82. An
opposite holding on a state of facts involving the same principle was Peofile v.
North River Sugar R. Co. 121 N. Y. 582. That the attorney general in this
case was within his powers see Atty. Gen. v Del. &- B. B. R. R., x2 C. E.
(N. J.) 631. The general powers of the attorney general gives him the right
t) bring such actions. McMullen v. Circuit Judge, 102 Mich. 6o8. And the
implied power of the attorney general, independent of statute, is sustained in
Board of Comrs. v. State, 92 Ind. 353. When the managing body of a cor-
poration are doing, or about to do, an ultra vires act of such a nature as to
produce public mischief, the attorney general, as representative of the public
may maintain an equitable suit for preventative relief. Pomeroy E. juris-
2 rudence, See. 1903. It would seem that agreements in restraint of trade
made between corporations ought to come within the category of public mis-
chief.
MANDAMUS-ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT.-UNI-
TED STATES Ex REL. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSIONERS v. LAKE SHORE &
MICHIGAN SOUTHERN Ry. Co., 25 SuP. CT. 538.-In an action relying on the
Inter State-Commerce, Act of T887, it was attempted to compel an interstate
carrier by mandamus proceedings to make a report to the commissioner, held
that under the act no such jurisdiction of an original proceeding by mandamus
is conferred upon a Federal circuit court. Harlan, J., dissenting.
In interpreting the judiciary act of 1789 (1 Stat. at L., chap. 20, see. ii,
14.) the Supreme Court decided that circuit courts possessed no such power.
Mclntire v. Wood, 7 Cranch, 504; McClung v. Silliman, 6 Wheat. 598.
Such rulings are not in conflict with the authority which is given to the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to issue writs of mandarius in
cases in which the parties are by the common law entitled to them. United
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States v. Schurz, zo2 U. S. 393, 394. Although Congress has not given the
circuit courts authority to issue such original writs, it has the constitutional
power to do so. Kendall '. United States, 12 Pet. 524. But that Congress
has not exercised this right in the Inter State Commerce Act, see 24 Stat, at
L. 379, chap. 104, see. 12, 16.
MORTGAGES-.PRIORITY-RIGHTS OF FIRST MORTGAGE.-MZAD V. HAM-MOND ET AL., 95 N. Y. SurP. 241.-Held, that a mortgage, payable on default
of any of the notes it secured, can be held by the first mortgagee (who has
taken up all the notes) as against a subsequent mortgagee, although only one
note has been defaulted and the others are not due.
Since the provision for foreclosure in case of the defaulting of any note
was valid; 'Wissner v. Chamberlin, 117 Ill. 568; Phillihs v.
Taylor, 96 Ala. 426; Cecil 'v. Dyne$, 2 Ind. 266; the first
mortgagee or his assignee could hold the mortgage for protection
against the second mortgagee, a subsequent minor, whose only remedy was
to redeem from the first mortgage. Hasselman v. Nickerman, 50 Ind. 444;
Knowles V. Robbin, 20 Iowa iox.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONs-CONsTUTIONAL LAW-PLICE POWER-DE-
PRIVATION OF PROPEXTY-EX-PARTE KEKO, 82 PACIFIC 24.-Held, that a
city ordinance prohibiting the maintenance or operation of any rock or stone
quarries within a prescribed portion of the city was not a proper exercise of
police power but was void as an unlawful interference with property rights.
When a business is not dangerous to the public health or welfare, it can-
not be subjected to therestriction of police legislation. Sonora V. Curtin, 137
Cal. 583. The right to acquire property is protected by the Constitution; the
right to use property for proper means is necessarily incidental; Ezjfarte
Newman, 9 Cal. 517. Police regulations as to usury are valid, as they aim to
protect the welfare of the needy, and as such are not an interference with
property rights. Ex fiarte Sichenstein, 7 Pacific, 728. Ordinances prohib-
iting indiscriminate laundering, in public, are valid as such would be a
nuisance and deleterious to public health. Barhie V. Coumly, 113 U. S. 27.
City can prohibit the cultivation of any product, deemed injurious or dan-
gerous to public health. Green v. City of Savanah, 6 Georgia, I. Laws regu-
lating hours of labor in mines are valid as they do not interfere with property
rights. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366. Law compelling mine owners to
keep scales are only valid when necessary for the protection of the public.
Millet v. Peofile 117 Illinois, 294. The above ordinance is apparently too
sweeping as quarrying is not usually injurious to the public.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-STRETs--DELICTS-CONTRACTSACTIONS.-
CITY OF PAWTUCKET V. PAWTUCKET ELECTRIC Co., 6z ATL. 48 (R. L).-For use
of streets defendant railway company paid city sums of money and in con-
fortnity with city ordinances executed a bond regulating their liability for a
certain contingency, namely, that if the city had to pay any damages on ac-
count of neglect of defendant or its officers and emplQyees, etc., the defen-
dant would repay city such damages. The city did have to pay damages for neg-
lect of defendant and now sues defendant in trespass on the case and not on the
bond. Held, that such bond determined the rights and respective liabilities
of the city and the railway company, and precluded the city from maintaining
an action of trespass on the case to rccover from defendant such damages.
When party is injured through object in street caused by negligence of
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third party, such injured paity may recover damages from city and city may
recover such damages from negligent third party in tort. Washington Gas
Co. v. District of Columbia, Iif U. S. 316; Bennet v. Fz field, i3 R. I. 139.
It is beyond question that there are some circumstances where a party may
sue another in an action excontractu, or ex delecto at his option. I Addi-
son, Torts, 27. There are apparently no cases, where an 'action has
been brought in tort where there was an existing contract
between the parties made with the intent that such contract
should alone govern the right of action. But where there is a tort
liability and an express contract is made regulating such liability for certain
contingency, if such contract can be construed to show that the intention of
the parties was to substitute the contract for the liability in tort it would seem
only just that the action should be ex contractu and not ex delicto. And the
bond in the present case was obviously so construed.
WATER AND WATER COURSZs-DAMs-DEFLECTION OF CURRENT.-IN-
HABITANTS OF DURHAM v. LISBON FALLS FIBRE Co., 61 ATL., 177 (MF.).-
Where by reason of a lawful erection of a dam in a proper and reasonable
manner the current of a non-navigable river has been deflected towards the
shore thereby causing injury to a highway along the bank of such river, held,
that such damage is damnum absque injuria.
The state is invested with the right of enacting such laws as give
authority to improve the navigation and thus promote the interests of the pub-
lic even although it may be an inconvenience to a private individual; such in-
convenience being damnum absque injuria. Angell on the Law of Waters,
93; Hollister v. Union Co., 9 Conn. 436. The present case applies this prin-
ciple to the improvement of inland waters. But the courts are not unani-
mous in so considering the matter. Thus it has been held that a person in-
jured by the erection of a milldam without his consent may recover damages
therefor notwithstanding that the dam was duly authorized by law. Cain v.
Hays, 4 Dam (Ky.) 338. Also the privilege of erecting a dam over
a watercourse is against common right, and to uphold the grant of such a
privilege the record must affirmatively show a compliance with all the requi-
sites of the statute. Martin v. Rushton, 42 Ala. 289.
WILLS-ATTESTATION-SUFFICIENCY.-CALKINS V. CALKINS, 75 N. E. 182
(ILL).-Where a statute requires wills to be attested in the presence of the
testator, held, not to be a sufficient compliance where witnesses withdrew to
another room beyond the vision of the testator and there signed their names.
The phrase "in the presence of the testator "has often been the sub-
ject of judicial investigation and construction. Such presence may be actual
or constructive. Under the English statute of Frauds, requiring attesting
witnesses to sign as above, constructive presence has been held sufficient.
Casson v. Dode, I Brown, C. C. 98. Courts will lean in support of a fair will
and not defeat it for a slip in form when the meaning has been complied with.
Right v. Price, I Doug. 243. The tendency of courts of this country has been
in favor of the English construction. That where the attestation was in an
adjoining room but within the vision of the testator, it
was in his presence, see Baldwin v. Baldwin, Exr., 81 Va. 405.
Riggs rF. Rzgs, 135 Mass. 238. But when in an adjoining room out of the
testator's sight, the door between being open, the contrary has been held in
accord with the present case. Mandeville v. Parker, 31 N. J. Eq. 242. So
also, where in the same room but out of the testator's sight by reason of some
intervening object. Brooks v. Dujftld, 25 Ga. 44.
